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José Medina situates his recent book as an exercise in nonideal theory (13) that furthers the project of articulating
an account of the integral role that epistemology plays
in relation to political theory and praxis. In other words,
following in the footsteps of Lorraine Code, Miranda Fricker,
Linda Alcoﬀ, and so many other laborers in the vineyard
of what might be thought of as liberatory epistemology,
Medina’s text undertakes the twofold project of articulating
the particularly (though not purely) epistemic manifestations
of oppression (especially in terms of gender, race, and
sexuality) on the one hand, and the epistemic practices
and conditions necessary for liberation from oppression on
the other. Medina oﬀers a diagnosis and a prescription in
relation to the ways and means whereby oppression harms
us in our particular capacities as knowers, and the ways and
means whereby our knowledge practices and standards
reinforce, legitimate, or mitigate oppression. The task he
thus sets for himself is indubitably ambitious, and he draws
upon a diverse array thinkers, traditions, and examples to
achieve his aims. The end result is an impressive example
of the integral link between intellectual work and activism,
pairing rigorous scholarship and theoretical acumen with
a clear sensitivity to the ways in which those intellectual
virtues will or will not “pay oﬀ” in terms of concrete action.
The range and depth of The Epistemology of Resistance
is such that I cannot hope to oﬀer a chapter-by-chapter
summary in the scope of this review, so I will proceed by
oﬀering a very brief sketch of the overall argument before
oﬀering a more in-depth account of what I take to be one
crucial aspect of the text.
Medina makes clear from the outset that his focus is upon
the “epistemic aspects of our social interactions” that “take
place in complex and diverse communities under conditions
of oppression” (3). As he argues in the course of the text,
oppression functions in part by fostering in the oppressors
a kind of ignorance, insensitivity, and indiﬀerence to the
suﬀering of others that he calls epistemic arrogance (31),
while among the oppressed it fosters ego skepticism,
which is “a skepticism about the self, about its capacities
and even about its very existence” (42). Oppression thus
fosters both a ﬁrst-order ignorance about the workings
of the social world and one’s role within that world, and a
meta-ignorance that obscures one’s sense of one’s own
epistemic failings (149). In other words, under just epistemic
conditions, one will typically acknowledge one’s own
epistemic lacunae—one will have some knowledge of one’s
ignorance, but oppression facilitates an ignorance of one’s
own ignorance through a variety of mechanisms Medina
describes in compelling detail. Signiﬁcantly, this ignorance
must be understood as an active ignorance (56) for which
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we bear responsibility as individuals and as members of
communities (226). This active ignorance, functioning on
both the ﬁrst-order and the meta-level, aims at establishing
a dominant mode of understanding the world that drowns
out, disavows, or ignores alternative understandings. Part of
the epistemic harm is thus that the false universal of (for
example) the masculine or white perspective, in establishing
itself as the normative hegemonic view, creates epistemic
conditions in which it is very diﬃcult for alternative, resistant
perspectives to assert themselves. At the heart of Medina’s
critical endeavor is thus a critique of any epistemological
theory that makes the arrival at some stable endpoint, or
even a ﬁxed and settled consensus, its telos. Rather, what
should motivate our epistemic endeavors is the fostering
of what he refers to as a “kaleidoscopic consciousness”
(200) in which knowledge is always in friction with resistant
perspectives between communities, between individuals
within a community, and internally to a given agent. Only
through this ongoing process of friction are we able to
approach “meta-lucidity” (192).
The “resistance” of the book’s title, therefore, refers
both to the praxis of resisting oppression, and to the
positive kinds of epistemic resistance that Medina argues
are necessary components of that praxis. Adequately
resisting oppression, in other words, requires that we take
responsibility for our epistemic shortcomings. Through
particularly compelling use of examples, Medina lays out
his account of the responsibility we bear as epistemic
agents on a variety of levels and vectors. As individuals,
we bear responsibility both for our ﬁrst-order ignorance
of the diﬀerent situations and perspectives of relevant
others and their histories (and very often in the case of the
privileged, of one’s own particular diﬀerence, perspective,
and history), as well as for the meta-ignorance we bear in
relation to that ﬁrst-order ignorance (the ways in which
we ignore or disavow our own ignorance). Both of these
manifestations of ignorance, however, are fostered and
supported within and through communities, and thus there
must always be a social aspect to that responsibility (158).
To advance his articulation of this social aspect, Medina’s
text oﬀers a thorough and sophisticated account of what he
refers to as “the insuﬃciencies of purely individualistic and
purely collectivist views of responsibility with respect to
justice” (313). While he does not deny that individuals can
and do act as individuals, and collectivities act collectively,
he argues that the most eﬃcacious political resistance
will require “chained action,” where actions are repeated
by others, and “coalesce in such a way that they become
a traceable performative chain, with each action in the
chain having traceable eﬀects in the subsequent actions
of others” (225). This makes it possible, he argues, for us
to conceive of our responsibilities as chained to that of
diverse others (individual and collective). Ultimately, an
epistemology of resistance aims not at the assimilation
or even integration of all diﬀerence, but rather seeks a
“network solidarity” (308) that acknowledges diﬀerence,
and fosters a pluralism that can generate and sustain
the beneﬁcial epistemic friction that Medina holds to be
a necessary condition both for eﬀective resistance of
oppression and for the cultivation of the epistemic virtues
conducive to meta-lucidity under conditions of what he
refers to as “polyphonic contextualism” (206).

SPRING 2014 | VOLUME 13 | NUMBER 2

Having oﬀered this very brief sketch of the overall
argument of Medina’s text, I will now turn to a more
focused engagement with a speciﬁc theme, namely, the
theme of metaphor in relation to our accounts of epistemic
justice. While Medina employs such metaphors throughout
the text, he only addresses the topic explicitly, and brieﬂy,
in the forward. In the remainder of this review, I will argue
that Medina’s actual use of metaphor oﬀers advantages
that remain only implicit in the text, and that rendering
them explicit can, in fact, strengthen his overall argument.
It is diﬃcult to take on issues of epistemology and
oppression without drawing upon a long and wellestablished line of metaphors for knowledge that appeal
to vision. The hegemony of this metaphor, as well as the
more common and compelling critiques of it, are doubtless
well known to anyone who has worked on these issues.1
Aside from the inherent privileging of perceptual ability
to be found in contrasting with disability, the visual
paradigm has been critiqued for entailing a rigid subject/
object distinction, and generating an understanding of
perception as a passive phenomenon. In the forward to The
Epistemology of Resistance, Medina states that he hopes
“to have contributed a bit to such overcoming [of the visual
paradigm] by avoiding the visual language at least in some
of my discussions when it was possible and appropriate,”
turning instead to more neutral terms like insensitivity and
numbness (xii). In describing this decision, he appeals
to the “problems associated with equating epistemic
deﬁciencies with perception disabilities,” but makes little
reference to the more theoretical critiques of the visual
metaphor (ibid.).
This is a weakness, I submit, insofar as the metaphors that
Medina actually uses in the course of his text manifest
advantages over the visual paradigm in terms of theory that
both illustrate his larger understanding and demonstrate
the weaknesses of the visual paradigm. For example, his
use of the friction metaphor appeals to touch. Polyphonic
contextualism and the need for our actions to “echo”
within a context of chained action appeal to sound (244).
These appeals to touch and sound avoid the theoretical
limitations of the visual paradigm in ways that Medina
himself does not make explicit. To touch is at the same
time to be touched, thus avoiding the radical subject/
object distinction common to the visual paradigm, and
placing the touching/touched in both a passive and active
role in relation to one another. Likewise, sound is a matter
of the interaction of components through a medium that
connects the listener with the source of the sound. Indeed,
sound is in fact generated by a kind of resistance between
objects, either when one object strikes another, as with a
drum, or when two objects are brought together in a way
that generates friction, as with a bow and violin string. This
means that friction/touch always generates sound (even if
it is not always audible by humans), which in turn is always
felt as much as heard, demonstrating the interconnectivity
of these two modes of sensation.
Medina’s use of these metaphors of touch and sound
thus help, because of the ways in which they function as
sensations, to illuminate his emphasis on interconnectivity,
and the role of resistance in epistemic life. For there would
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be no touch, and no sound, without resistance (friction)
and movement. We see in these metaphors, therefore, an
illustration not only of the centrality of resistance but of the
need for constant and dynamic development and change
in our epistemic life—that is, as Medina asserts in relation
to knowledge, we are not aiming toward the arrival at some
ﬁxed and static conclusion but, rather, at the ongoing
generation of friction. Thus, while the standard paradigm of
vision (which is in actuality a very deep misunderstanding
of how vision works) invites us to think of objects as
discrete individuals, where one actively sees and the
other is passively seen and it is common for images to be
understood as static, the metaphors Medina employs avoid
this misapprehension of the social world and its role in our
capacity as knowers.

epistemology and oppression. It most assuredly deserves
to be read by those theorists and activists working in and
around these issues.
NOTES
1.

See Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 12.

This being said, Medina is quite rightly concerned with the
impact the use of such metaphors may have on those who
lack access to one or more avenues of sense perception,
and though his use of aural and tactile metaphors may not
escape this concern either, he makes clear what he sees as
the advantages of his preferred terminology. “Insensitivity
and numbness are more appropriate than blindness
because,” he tells us, “they can be easily extended to the
non-perceptual, and indeed the epistemic deﬁciencies
in question go beyond our perceptual organs” (xii). Thus,
in addition to the disrespect the visual metaphor shows
for blind people, Medina’s concern is that perception in
general does not capture the full scope of the epistemic
deﬁciencies that are the focus of the text, and so he
proposes the terms “insensitivity” and “numbness.”
Nevertheless, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to understand how to
conceive of insensitivity or numbness apart from some
appeal to sensory (and thus perceptual) organs. On the one
hand, to be insensitive, or numb, literally just means to lack
sensation. We may use such terms to describe emotional
distance or lack of tact, but when we apply them in this way
to “non-perceptual” deﬁciencies, they are still metaphors
that appeal to the appropriate use of functioning sensory
organs, and so do not avoid the disrespecting of those
who lack the use of those organs. On the other hand, given
Medina’s own commitments to the aﬀective dimension
of epistemic interactions (81), and the foregrounding of
embodiment (268), it seems strange for him to draw a clear
boundary between the perceptual and the non-perceptual
in the ﬁrst place. Insensitivity and numbness are thus, like
metaphors of vision, metaphoric appeals to sensory organs
(in general), yet they are more than mere metaphors, insofar
as a polyphonic contextualism aiming at the generation of
epistemic friction between inescapably socially embodied
agents seems on every level to be concerned with literal,
and not just metaphorical, sensitivity to oneself and others.
This move does not, in other words, escape his concern
about disrespect, and given the role that perception plays
in his account of epistemology, it may not be possible to
completely avoid the problem. How to address it in the
long term is an important question beyond the scope of
this review.
In conclusion, Medina’s outstanding book makes a crucial
and timely contribution to a cluster of philosophical
problems spanning several sub-ﬁelds and disciplines that
contribute to our understanding of the relationship between
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